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MOOTNESS AND THE APPROACH TO COSTS AWARDS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF CHRISTIAN ROBERTS v MINISTER OF SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT CASE NO 32838/05 (2010) (TPD) 
 
S Heleba* 
 
1  Introduction  
 
After nearly three years of waiting, the North Gauteng High Court (then the Pretoria 
High Court) finally handed down judgment in March 2010 in the case of Christian 
Roberts v Minister of Social Development.1 The case was a constitutional challenge 
to section 10 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant Regulations, 
which set the age for accessing an old age grant at 60 for women and 65 for men. 
After the hearing the High Court had reserved judgment. Pending judgment the 
government had amended the legislation in dispute so that the pensionable age for 
the purposes of accessing a social grant would be equalised over time. Despite the 
change in legislation, the High Court found against the applicants and punished them 
with a costs order.     
 
Until such time as it is appealed against and overturned, as it stands this decision 
presents a grave concern to some constitutional law principles relating to mootness 
and the approach to costs in constitutional litigation between the State and private 
litigants. Particularly, the decision threatens the hitherto special role played by public 
interest litigants in vindicating constitutional rights ranging from access to housing 
and land, to the rights of the child, gay men and lesbian women and freedom of 
expression, among others. This contribution tackles two issues arising from the 
judgment of the High Court. The first issue is that of ‘mootness’, which arises from 
the government's decision to amend the impugned legislation complained of by the 
                                                          
*    Siyambonga Heleba. LLB (UWC), LLM (UU), Adv Cert (AAU) Dip (UJ). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
University of Johannesburg. Email: scheleba@uj.ac.za. This case note is based on a the paper 
presented at the Law Teachers Conference on 18 January 2011, at the University of 
Stellenbosch. The author is indebted to the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments 
on an earlier draft of this note. All mistakes are mine. 
1  Christian Roberts v Minister of Social Development Unreported Case No 32838/05 (2010) (TPD). 
The author attended the two-day hearing of the case in September 2007, in his capacity as a 
researcher at the Community Law Centre, of the University of the Western Cape, and an amicus 
in the case.     
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applicant, which effectively knocked the wind out of the applicants' constitutional 
challenge.  The second issue is the decision by the judge to award an adverse costs 
order against the applicants and the amici. Guided by how the courts in South Africa 
and abroad have dealt with similar matters in the past, in this contribution the author 
aims to demonstrate the implications of this decision for constitutional law generally 
and for public interest litigation in particular.  
 
Quite apart from the two issues referred to above as precipitating the present 
discussion, there is one more reason why a review of this judgment is necessary. A 
recent discussion with the attorney for the amici on the case has revealed that the 
prohibitively high costs of taking the matter on appeal to the full bench have 
discouraged the parties from pursuing this avenue. 2  The losing parties are also 
hoping that the government will come to its senses and abandon the costs awarded 
in its favour. This unfortunately has not happened until now. Thus the single judge's 
erroneous decision remains law for the time being, although it is wrong law.        
 
The discussion commences with a brief factual background to the case, followed by 
a discussion of the important constitutional principle of the doctrine of mootness. 
This is followed by an outline of the principles relating to costs orders in matters 
raising an important constitutional issue, and in matters brought in the public interest. 
The review concludes that the court a quo erred in deciding the merits of the case, 
and that even when it had decided to pronounce on the merits – as it did – it 
nonetheless should not have punished the applicants and the amici with the costs 
thereof.  The correct approach was to order that each party pay his or her own costs.                           
 
2  Factual background 
 
The pertinent facts are that four male applicants, above the age of 60 but below 65 
at the time of the application, mounted a constitutional challenge to section 10 of the 
Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant Regulations, which set the age for 
accessing old age grants at 60 for women and 65 for men. They attacked the 
differentiation on the basis that it violates the equality clause (section 9(3)) and the 
                                                          
2  A discussion with Moray Hawthorn of Webber Wentzel Attorneys, on 24 January 2012. 
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right of access to social assistance (section 27(1)(c)) guaranteed by the Constitution. 
For its part, the government argued that the differentiation is aimed at addressing 
inequities faced by women generally, and by African women in particular. It was 
argued for the government that African women faced race, class and social 
discrimination during apartheid. However, subsequent to the hearing the government 
brought the discrimination to an end by amending the impugned legislation so that 
the differentiation would be phased out over a three-year period, so that men would 
access social old age grants from the age of 63 by April 2008; from 61 years by April 
2009; and ultimately achieve equality (at 60) by April 2010. Despite this change in 
the legal position, the High Court found against the applicants and upheld the 
contentions justifying the retention of the differentiating scheme at the time the case 
was heard. In effect the High Court order sought to retain a dead legislative scheme.  
 
3 The mootness doctrine 
 
The legal doctrine confronting the Court – but ignored by the Court – in Christian 
Roberts is known as 'mootness'. The doctrine is well developed in American 
constitutional law jurisprudence. Accordingly, a case is a moot one if it3 
 
…seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is 
none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has actually been asserted 
and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any 
reason, cannot have any practical effect upon a then existing controversy. 
 
 Furthermore, a case will be moot4 
 
[i]f the parties are not adverse, if the controversy is hypothetical, or if the judgment 
of the court for some other reason cannot operate to grant any actual relief, and the 
court is without power to grant a decision. 
 
Barron and Dienes put it succinctly when they observe that a "[a] case or controversy 
requires present flesh and blood dispute that the courts can resolve".5 Loots, a South 
                                                          
3     Diamond 1946 U Pa L Rev 125. See also Brilmayer 1979 Harv L Rev 297; Fountaine 1998 Am U 
L Rev 1053; Peter and John Federal Courts. For a recent critical discussion of the mootness 
doctrine see Hall 2008 works.bepress.com.              
4  Diamond 1946 U Pa L Rev 125.    
5  Barron and Dienes (eds) Constitutional Law 44. 
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African constitutional commentator, endorses these sentiments and points out that a 
case6 
 
….is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live 
controversy or the prejudice, or threat of prejudice, to the plaintiff no longer exists." 
 
It is without a doubt that the case of Christian Roberts perfectly fits the description of 
a moot case as a result of the government's amending the impugned legislative 
provisions and the accompanying regulations. The consequence of the Court's giving 
judgment in Christian Roberts is that any order it makes on the merits would have no 
practical effect on the applicants or the public at large, and would serve no purpose 
but an academic one.7           
 
4 The mootness doctrine in South African constitutional law 
 
4.1  General principles 
 
Loots observes that the mootness doctrine – as we know it – did not find application 
in South African law before the advent of the Interim Constitution of 1993.8 However, 
she concedes that as early 1963 our courts have declined to decide cases where the 
issues had no more than academic significance and as such would not have a 
binding effect on the parties.9 Since 1994 there have been a number of cases in 
which the Constitutional Court has applied the doctrine.   
     
In JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security,10 the Court, per Didcott 
J, stated that courts are governed by a judicial policy which vests in them a 
discretion, and that it is11 
                                                          
6    Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 18.  
7  It would, however, be useful – as it was indeed – in awarding costs in the matter. The problems 
with the manner in which the Court dealt with the issue of costs in the matter are highlighted in s 
6 of this case note.    
8 Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 20.  
9 Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 20, citing the case of Masuku v State President 1994 
4 SA 374 (T) 380I which refers to Ex parte Nell 1963 1 SA 754 (A) 760B-C.     
10  JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 12 BCLR 1599 (CC). 
11  JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 12 BCLR 1599 (CC) para 15.  
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a well-established and uniformly observed policy which directs them not to exercise 
it in favour of deciding points that are merely abstract, academic or hypothetical 
ones. 
 
In that case, the legislation complained of by the applicants had been replaced by 
new legislation by the time the Court delivered judgment. The Court declined to 
make a decision on the merits of the case on the basis – as the Court put it, that12 
 
[T]here can hardly be a clearer instance of issues that are wholly academic, of 
issues exciting no interest but a historic one, than those on which our ruling is 
wanted have now become. The repeal of the Publications Act has disposed 
altogether of the questions pertaining to that. And any aspect of the one about the 
Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act which our previous decision on it did 
not answer fully has been foreclosed by its repeal in turn. I therefore conclude that 
we should decline at this stage to grant a declaratory order on either topic. 
 
In a persuasive dissenting opinion in President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo,13 Didcott J expressed the view that the case had become moot as14 
 
…the respondent in this matter could derive no apparent benefit or advantage from 
the declaration which he sought and obtained from the lower court. The issue raised 
by him had also become by then 'wholly academic ... exciting no interest but an 
historical one'. 
 
The respondent in the case, an imprisoned father of a twelve year old, had mounted 
a constitutional challenge to the exercise by the President of powers in terms of a 
presidential pardon decree. In terms of the decree the President was to grant an 
early release from prison to certain mothers of children younger than twelve years 
old. The respondent argued that the decree discriminated against him and his son on 
the grounds of sex and gender, in violation of his right to equality contained in 
section 8 of the Interim Constitution. Thus he sought an order from the Constitutional 
Court confirming the order of invalidity granted by the High Court in his favour. 
According to Didcott J the respondent stood to benefit nothing from the order as, in 
the first place, he would not secure an early release from prison because the child 
was not younger than twelve years old when the case was lodged in the High Court 
and had reached the age of thirteen when the confirmation proceedings 
commenced. Secondly, deciding the case would result in no public benefit – and was 
                                                          
12  JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 12 BCLR 1599 (CC) para 17. 
13  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC).  
14  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 57.   
S HELEBA                                                                                             PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
572 / 638 
 
therefore not required for the future guidance of anybody as the decree was a unique 
measure, taken to celebrate the inauguration of our first democratically elected 
President.15 Thirdly, said the Court, 16 
 
[i]ts repetition on any similarly auspicious occasion which may arise some day 
seems improbable, in the same form at any rate. It is certainly less likely than 
censorship to be repeated. 
  
In S v Dlamini the Constitutional Court held that mootness may prevent the Court 
from entertaining a request for a confirmation order where there remains no triable 
issue.17 In President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institute 
the Court stated that18 
 
[m]ootness is particularly likely to be a bar to relief where the constitutional issue is 
not merely moot as between the parties but is also moot relative to society at large, 
and no considerations of compelling public interest require the court to reach a 
conclusion. 
 
In S v Manamela the Constitutional Court stated that it will decide a case despite the 
argument of mootness if to do so would be in the public interest.19  
 
The Constitutional Court did indeed entertain a moot matter in MEC for Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay.20 In this case a school learner had returned to school from a 
holiday with a nose stud. The school decided the learner would not be allowed to 
wear the stud. The respondent, the learner's mother, took the school and the MEC 
for Education in KwaZulu-Natal to the Equality Court, alleging that they had unfairly 
discriminated against her child and had violated the child's religious and cultural 
rights. The Equality Court found that the school's decision to ban the wearing of the 
stud did not unfairly discriminate against the learner. The mother appealed against 
this finding to the High Court. The High Court upheld the appeal, holding that the 
school had unfairly discriminated against the learner.  
                                                          
15  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58. 
16  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58. 
17  S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 7 BCLR 771 (CC), paras 27, 32.   
18  President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 (CC) 
16, 17 and 18. See also Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 20. 
19   S v Manamela 2000 5 BCLR 491 (CC) para 12. See also Independent Electoral Commission v        
Langeberg Municipality 2001 9 BCLR 883 (CC) para 11; AAA Investments Pty (Ltd) v Micro   
Finance Regulatory Council 2006 11 BCLR 1255 (CC) para 27.   
20    MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC).    
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The School and the MEC for Education in KwaZulu-Natal appealed against the 
decision of the High Court to the Constitutional Court. By the time the matter was 
heard in the Constitutional Court the learner had matriculated and left the school. 
Because of this and the fact that the National Department of Education had issued 
new guidelines – which in her view changed the legal landscape – as a result of the 
litigation, the respondent contended that the matter had become moot.21 The Court 
conceded that the learner's departure from the school in question rendered the case 
moot,22 but the Court disagreed that the matter was moot also because of the new 
guidelines issued by the Department.23 
 
The Court's rejection of the respondent's argument that the new guidelines altered 
the legal landscape was prompted by the nature of the guidelines. The Court 
considered the language in which the guidelines were couched and concluded that 
the guidelines were non-binding on schools. In the view of the Court the guidelines 
hardly changed the legal position as24 
 
…schools…might consider the guidelines and lawfully decide to adopt exactly the 
same provision that is before us. Any aggrieved party would be entitled to bring 
exactly the same challenge. 
 
The Court further justified its decision to proceed with the hearing by pointing to the 
effectiveness of the order it would make if the case was heard. In particular the Court 
stated:25    
  
There is accordingly no doubt that the order, if the matter is heard, will have a 
significant practical effect on the School and all other schools in the country.... It is 
therefore in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.                            
 
The Constitutional Court has recently endorsed the above approach in Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality.26 In this case the applicants, who had been 
evicted from their homes without a court order, sought leave to appeal against an 
unfavourable decision by the court a quo. The respondent opposed the application 
                                                          
21  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 28.   
22    MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 32.  
23  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 33.    
24   MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 34.   
25   MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 35.  
26    Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC).    
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on the ground, inter alia, that the matter had become moot as the applicant had 
already been moved. The Court disagreed. It stated that not only were the rights of 
the applicants infringed, but there was a threat of further infringement.27 The Court 
further stated that the matter still presented live controversy and the applicants would 
benefit from the order it might make if the matter was heard. In particular the Court 
stated:28 
 
Although the removal has taken place, this case still presents a live controversy 
regarding the lawfulness of the eviction.  Generally, unlawful conduct is inimical to 
the rule of law and to the development of a society based on dignity, equality and 
freedom.  Needless to say, the applicants have an interest in the adjudication of the 
constitutional issue at stake. The matter cannot therefore be said to be moot.  It is 
also live because if we find that the removal of the applicants was unlawful, it would 
be necessary to consider their claim for restitutionary relief. (footnotes omitted).            
 
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court followed the correct approach to the 
question of mootness in both the Pillay and Pheko cases. The doctrine of mootness 
allows a court to decide a moot case if there is a possibility of the infringement 
complained of in the current matter being repeated in the future. In the Pillay case, 
unless the Constitutional Court confirmed the finding of the High Court – as it 
essentially did – the soft nature of the new guidelines issued by the Department as a 
result of the litigation meant that the threat of harm to learners' religious and cultural 
rights around the country continued. In the Pheko case, indeed, the failure by the 
Court to rule on whether or not an eviction without a court order contravened section 
26(3) of the Constitution would have created legal uncertainty. This posed a big 
threat of future infringements. Thus it would benefit not only the applicants for the 
Court to decide the matter, but society as a whole.         
 
In 1997 parliament inserted section 21A into the Supreme Court Act29 to give the 
Supreme Court of Appeal or any High Court sitting as a court of appeal the discretion 
to dismiss an appeal if the circumstances are such that the order it might give will 
have no practical effect or result.30 According to the Supreme Court of Appeal the 
effect of section 21A was to do away with such ambiguous concepts as "abstract", 
                                                          
27    Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 31.  
28    Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 32.. 
29  Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, as amended.  
30  Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 21. She points out that the amendment was enacted 
in 1993, but came into effect only on 14 February 1997.        
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"academic" or "hypothetical" as criteria for the exercise of the power of a court of 
appeal not to hear an appeal.31 Instead, the Court held, "…section 21A imposes a 
positive test: Will the judgment or order have a practical effect or result."32 According 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Western Cape Education Department v George, 
the practical effect or result requirement of section 21A33  
 
…was wide enough to include a practical effect or result in some other respect, 
such as a matter of wide public interest or urgency, or to resolve conflicting High 
Court decisions.           
 
While there is no equivalent of section 21A in respect of the Constitutional Court, the 
Court has held that it has discretion to exercise its powers in terms of section 172(2) 
of the final Constitution to entertain a confirmation proceeding even when the issue 
in the case has become moot 34  and that in exercising this discretion it would 
consider if any order it may make would have any practical effect, either on the 
parties or on others.35 The rule also finds application in respect of appeals to the 
Constitutional Court.36       
 
4.2 Applying the mootness doctrine in Christian Roberts   
 
As stated above, pending judgment in the case Christian Roberts the government 
had conceded defeat by removing the discriminating provisions in the Social 
Assistance Act, so that ultimately – that is, in 2010 – both men and women would 
access old age social grants at the age of 60. Thus at the time of delivery of the 
judgment, as was the position in the JT Publishing; Freedom of Expression Institute37 
and Uthukela District Municipalities v President of the Republic of South Africa38 - 
three cases which are almost identical to the Christian Roberts case as they involved 
                                                          
31  In Premier, Provinsie, Mmpulanga v Groblerdalse Stadsraad 1998 2 SA 1136 (SCA) 114D-F, as 
referred to in Loots "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" 21.               
32  Premier, Provinsie Mmpulanga v Groblerdalse Stadsraad 1998 2 SA 1136 (SCA) para 114 D-F. 
33  Western Cape Education Department v George 1998 3 SA 77 SCA 84D-E. 
34  In President of the Ordinary Court Marshal v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 
(CC) para 16. See also MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 
35.         
35  President of the Ordinary Court Marshal v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 (CC) 
para 16. 
36  See Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 9 BCLR 883 (CC) para 9. 
37  President of the Ordinary Court Marshal v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 (CC). 
38  Uthukela District Municipalities v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 11 BCLR 1220 
(CC). 
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a change in the offending legislation pending judgment – the controversy had ceased 
to be a live one, and the issues had become wholly academic, and indeed excited no 
interest but a historic one. 
 
It must, however, be asked if the court in Christian Roberts felt that it had to decide 
the matter despite it's being moot? We must ask this question because, as was 
shown above, a court has discretion to decide a moot case in exceptional 
circumstances. A reading of the above cases suggests that there are two discernible 
exceptions to the judicial policy governing moot cases. The first instance would be 
when it is in the public interest or society at large to decide the matter. The rationale 
here is that the case is moot only as between the parties, but there remains a need 
to guide future situations of a similar nature. The second instance, also related to the 
first one, is when the offending practice or conduct is capable of repetition. Both of 
these instances satisfy an essential underlying requirement, which is that the 
declaratory order must be of practical effect or advantage to someone. The answer 
to the question posed above in relation to the Christian Roberts matter is in the 
negative. As was the position in the three similar cases referred to above, there 
existed no such exceptional circumstances in the Christian Roberts case compelling 
the court to decide the matter. It is not difficult to see why that is so. A change in the 
offending legislation in this case – as in the other three cases – put the entire case to 
bed. There is certainly no future guidance to be provided to society at large by the 
Christian Roberts judgment. And indeed there is no threat of repetition of the 
offensive conduct without enabling legislation. Therefore the Court should have 
declined giving judgment in the matter.   
 
5 The approach to costs in constitutional litigation  
 
5.1  General principles  
 
As a general approach to costs awards, the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin39 
stated that factors such as the "conduct of the parties", the "conduct of their legal 
representatives", "whether a party achieves a technical victory only", the "nature of 
                                                          
39  Ferreira v Levin; Vryehoek v Powell 4 BCLR 441 (CC).    
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the litigants" and the "nature of the proceedings" were influential in the consideration 
by a court of whether or not to deprive a victorious party of their costs. The Court 
went on to state that: 40 
 
…[T]he principles which have been developed in relation to the award of costs are 
by their nature sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet new needs which may 
arise in regard to  constitutional litigation. They [the factors] offer a useful point of 
departure. If the need arises the rules may have to be substantially adapted; this 
however should be done on a case by case basis. It is unnecessary, if not 
impossible, at this stage to attempt to formulate comprehensive rules regarding 
costs in constitutional litigation. (footnotes omitted).              
 
Some two years later Ackerman J, who wrote the decision in Ferreira v Levin above, 
was of the view in Motsepe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue41 that the time had 
come for the Constitutional Court to develop a general rule in relation to costs 
awards in constitutional litigation. In this regard he stated that42   
 
…one should be cautious in awarding costs against litigants who seek to enforce 
their constitutional right against the state, particularly where the constitutionality of a 
statutory provision is attacked, lest such orders have an unduly inhibiting or 
"chilling" effect on other potential litigants in this category. This cautious approach 
cannot, however, be allowed to develop into an inflexible rule so that litigants are 
induced into believing that they are free to challenge the constitutionality of statutory 
provisions in this court, no matter how spurious the grounds for doing so may be or 
how remote the possibility that this court will grant them access. This can neither be 
in the interests of the administration of justice nor fair to those who are forced to 
oppose such attacks.   
 
The Court felt that the conduct of the applicant in this case was objectionable for a 
number of reasons and thus punished the applicant with a costs order.  
 
The Court later endorsed this rule in Affordable Medicines Trust43 as an important 
principle in dealing with costs awards in constitutional cases between private parties 
and the State. The applicants in the court a quo had achieved partial success in that 
certain sub-regulations to the legislation they attacked on constitutional grounds 
were found unconstitutional by the court of first instance. Despite this, the court a 
quo saddled the applicants with costs on the basis that the applicants were not 
                                                          
40   Ferreira v Levin; Vryehoek v Powell 4 BCLR 441 (CC) para 3.   
41   Motsepe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1997 6 BCLR 692 (CC).  
42  Motsepe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1997 6 BCLR 692 (CC) para 30. 
43    Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC).   
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"indigent as they were in a position to finance the litigation and had done so 'with 
vigour'''.44  The Constitutional Court stated that as a general rule "in constitutional 
litigation an unsuccessful litigant ought not to be ordered to pay costs".45 The Court 
went on to state that: 46   
 
The rationale for this rule is that an award of costs might have a chilling effect on 
the litigants who might wish to vindicate their rights. But this is not an inflexible rule. 
There may be circumstances that justify a departure from this rule such as where 
the litigation is frivolous and vexatious. There may be conduct on the part of the 
litigant that deserves censor by the Court which may influence the Court to order an 
unsuccessful litigant to pay costs. The ultimate goal is to do what is just having 
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.       
           
The Court thus reversed the costs order by the court a quo and ordered that each 
party keep their own costs. 
 
More recently the Constitutional Court affirmed this approach to costs in litigation 
with a constitutional dimension in Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources.47 
This was an appeal by the applicant against the costs order of the North Gauteng 
High Court (the "High Court"). Litigation in this case was precipitated by refusal by 
the Registrar of Genetic Resources (a state functionary) to provide the applicant 
certain information in the possession of the Registrar pertaining to the production of 
genetically modified food. Among other things the applicant complained that the 
Registrar's conduct violated its right to information held by the State in terms of 
section 32 of the Constitution.48 The applicant was successful in the litigation in that 
it had been given access to the information it sought and which it was entitled to 
receive (not confidential information). The High Court, however, gave a punitive 
costs order against the applicant on the basis that the applicant had not been 
specific enough in its request about the precise information sought.  
 
                                                          
44    Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC) para 139.  
45    Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC) para 138.   
46    Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC) para 38.   
47   Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC).  
48    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996.  
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The Constitutional Court severely reprimanded the High Court for the approach it 
took in relation to costs in this matter. The Court recalled its approach to costs 
awards in constitutional litigation and stated: 49 
 
In litigation between the government and a private party seeking to assert a 
constitutional right, Affordable Medicines established the principle that ordinarily, if 
the government loses, it should pay the costs of the other side, and if the 
government wins, each party should bear its own costs. (footnotes omitted). 
 
The Court stated that the rationale for this principle is three-fold. In the first place, the 
Court observed, the rule50    
 
diminishes the chilling effect that adverse costs orders would have on parties 
seeking to assert constitutional rights.  Constitutional litigation frequently goes 
through many courts and the costs involved can be high.  Meritorious claims might 
not be proceeded with because of a fear that failure could lead to financially ruinous 
consequences.  Similarly, people might be deterred from pursuing constitutional 
claims because of a concern that even if they succeed they will be deprived of their 
costs because of some inadvertent procedural or technical lapse. 
 
The second reason concerns the reach of the outcome in a constitutional matter, its 
contribution to jurisprudence, as well as its meaning to South Africans. In the words 
of the Court: 51 
 
[C]onstitutional litigation, whatever the outcome, might ordinarily bear not only on 
the interests of the particular litigants involved, but on the rights of all those in 
similar situations.  Indeed, each constitutional case that is heard enriches the 
general body of constitutional jurisprudence and adds texture to what it means to be 
living in a constitutional democracy. 
 
The third reason behind the principle, according to the Court, concerns the bearer of 
the primary responsibility to ensure that both the law and the conduct of the state are 
compatible with the Constitution, as well as the reasons for the litigation. More 
specifically, the Court observed: 52 
 
Thirdly, it is the state that bears primary responsibility for ensuring that both the law 
and state conduct are consistent with the Constitution. If there should be a genuine, 
non-frivolous challenge to the constitutionality of a law or of state conduct, it is 
                                                          
49    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 22.  
50    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 23.  
51    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 23. 
52    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 23.   
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appropriate that the state should bear the costs if the challenge is good, but if it is 
not, then the losing non-state litigant should be shielded from the costs 
consequences of failure.  In this way responsibility for ensuring that the law and 
state conduct is constitutional is placed at the correct door. (footnotes omitted)    
 
The Court reversed the costs order in favour of the applicant both in the High Court 
and in the Constitutional Court for a number of reasons: In the first place the Court 
affirmed the general rule that a successful party should have its costs paid by the 
losing side. The Court observed that: 53 
 
In the present matter, Biowatch achieved substantial success.  Not only did it 
manage to rebut a number of preliminary objections aimed at keeping the case out 
of court altogether, it also succeeded in getting a favourable response from the 
Court to eight of the eleven categories of information  it sought.  
 
The second reason concerned the failure by the High Court to consider the 
constitutional aspect of the case. The Court noted that in granting the application for 
leave to appeal against his costs order to the Full Bench, the single judge conceded 
overlooking the constitutional dimension of the litigation when awarding costs and 
merely stated that it had been "at the back of his mind".  This, however, did not save 
the judge's mishap from criticism by the Court. The Court found that54 
 
…his failure to expressly locate the costs award in a constitutional setting must 
raise serious doubts as to the weight, if any, given to the constitutional context. 
 
Before approaching the Constitutional Court, the applicant had appealed to the Full 
Bench of the High Court against the costs order. The Full Bench had similarly 
dismissed the appeal without considering the constitutional aspect of the case. The 
Court was particularly sharp in its language against the Full Bench for its failure to 
consider the constitutional dimension to the litigation in its consideration of the 
appeal.  In particular, the Court said that "the omission [by the Full Bench] of the 
constitutional dimension constitutes a serious misdirection".55 
 
The third reason was that the Court found nothing untoward about the conduct of the 
applicant during litigation that would justify – not even the lack of specificity in the 
                                                          
53    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 43.  
54    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 41.   
55    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 42.  
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applicant's requests for information complained of by the single judge – a punitive 
costs order against the applicant. Furthermore, the applicant's case was neither 
frivolous nor vexatious, according to the Court.  In this regard the Court stated: 56 
 
The lack of precision and the sweeping character of the requests for information as 
well as of the claims made in the notice of motion had not prevented the High Court 
from being able to give a thorough and well-substantiated judgment on the merits.  
Far from being frivolous or vexatious, the application raised important constitutional 
issues and achieved considerable success. 
  
The fourth reason had to do with why the applicant was forced to litigate in the first 
place. The Court pointed out that it was the State's failure to provide the information 
sought which triggered the litigation. Thus in the words of the Court:57 
 
Biowatch had been compelled to go to court.  The root cause of the dispute had 
been the persistent failure of the governmental authorities to provide legitimately-
sought information.  They were obliged to pass on information in their possession, 
save only for material which could reasonably be withheld in order to protect certain 
prescribed interests.  As the High Court ultimately found, the bulk of the requests 
referred to information that had indeed to be disclosed.  Only after four requests 
had been made to different state officials, without success, was litigation embarked 
upon. (footnote omitted) 
 
The fifth reason concerned the question as to who bears the primary responsibility to 
ensure that both the law and State conduct are consistent with the Constitution. The 
Court found that the state was the bearer of this responsibility, and that it had failed 
to discharge this duty by not providing legitimately sought information which it was 
legally obliged to release. The Court held that:58 
 
Not only did the appropriate officials fail to fulfil their constitutional and statutory 
duties in providing information, thus compelling Biowatch to litigate, the 
governmental agencies compounded this by obdurately raising a series of 
unsustainable technical and procedural objections to Biowatch's suit. 
     
Notably in the Biowatch case the Court did not simply recite the rule as developed in 
the abovementioned cases, but added the welcome element of considering who 
bears the primary responsibility to ensure that both the law and state conduct are at 
one with the Constitution. 
                                                          
56    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 43.    
57    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 44.  
58   Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 37.  
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5.3 Public interest litigation and costs in the Constitutional Court  
 
As pointed out above, there is no discernible reason as to why the Court in Christian 
Roberts gave judgment, except to punish the applicants and the amici with a costs 
order. This has significant implications for the development of constitutional 
jurisprudence in general and for public interest litigation in particular. 
 
In Biowatch the applicants and the amici59 pointed out to the Court the role played by 
public interest advocacy groups in advancing constitutional litigation. They 
contended that an adverse costs award would not only inhibit the institution of 
litigation in the public interest but would also be disastrous to their "…capacity… to 
exist and do their work".60 They further argued that the "High Court misdirected itself 
in not giving any, or sufficient, regard to the fact that Biowatch was a public interest 
NGO litigating not on its own behalf but in the public interest. Sachs J, on behalf of 
the majority, dismissed this contention. He stated that in his view the correct starting 
point in determining costs in a constitutional litigation should not be who the parties 
are, but the nature of the issues.61 He further stated that:62 
 
Equal protection under the law requires that costs awards not be dependent on 
whether the parties are acting in their own interests or in the public interest.  Nor 
should they be determined by whether the parties are financially well-endowed or 
indigent or, as in the case of many NGOs, reliant on external funding. The primary 
consideration in constitutional litigation must be the way in which a costs order 
would hinder or promote the advancement of constitutional justice.           
 
Sachs J further emphasised the obligation that the courts be impartial towards the 
litigants who appear before them, and that no litigant should be favoured over the 
other in awarding costs because of their social status. In particular, he stated that63 
 
…litigants should not be treated disadvantageously in making costs and related 
awards simply because they are pursuing commercial interests and have deep 
pockets.  Nor should they be looked upon with favour because they are fighting for 
the poor and lack funds themselves.  What matters is whether rich or poor, 
                                                          
59    The Centre for Child Law, Lawyers for Human Rights and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies.   
60    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 15.    
61   Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 16.  
62    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 16 
63    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 17.  
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advantaged or disadvantaged, they are asserting rights protected by the 
Constitution. 
 
He concluded that the nature of the issues and the manner in which the litigants 
conducted themselves during the proceedings should be decisive in determining the 
award of costs in constitutional litigation. In his words:64 
 
…a party should not get a privileged status simply because it is acting in the public 
interest or happens to be indigent.  It should be held to the same standards of 
conduct as any other party, particularly if it has had legal representation.  This 
means it should not be immunised from appropriate sanctions if its conduct has 
been vexatious, frivolous, professionally unbecoming or in any other similar way 
abusive of the processes of the Court. 
 
It is submitted that Sachs J's views on how to approach the issue of costs in litigation 
instituted in the public interest seem not to be entirely congruent with the rapidly 
rising tide of cases cautioning against awarding adverse costs orders against public 
interest advocacy groups which raise constitutional issues.  In these cases the 
significance of the role played by these groups has been singled out by the courts. 
As early in our constitutional dispensation as 1996, Mohamed DP, in Ex parte 
Gauteng Legislature,65 cautioned against discouraging persons trying to vindicate 
their constitutional rights from doing so by the risk of attracting an adverse costs 
order if they lost the case on merits. Mohamed DP in particular stated that persons 
seeking66 
 
…to ventilate an important issue of constitutional principle … should not be 
discouraged from doing so by the risk of having to pay the costs of their 
adversaries, if the Court takes a view which is different from the view taken by the 
petitioner.  This, of course, does not mean that such litigants can be completely 
protected from that risk.  The Court, in its discretion, might direct that they pay the 
costs of their adversaries if, for example, the grounds of attack on the impugned 
statute are frivolous or vexatious or they have acted from improper motives or there 
are other circumstances which make it in the interest of justice to direct that such 
costs should be paid by the losing party.  
  
                                                          
64    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 17.   
65   Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995, 1996 3 SA 165 (CC).       
66    Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995, 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 36.  
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Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole67 is another case where 
the Constitutional Court declined to award costs in favour of the State, where the 
applicant had withdrawn the referral to the Court after the relief sought had become 
moot. This was on the basis that the "applicants' complaints were not frivolous or 
vexatious and there can be no suggestion that they acted on improper motives". 
 
Langa J in Democratic Alliance v Masondo considered the fact that the litigation was 
in the public interest as an important factor in determining costs and reversed an 
adverse court a quo costs order against the applicant. He observed that:68  
 
In the High Court, the appellants were ordered to pay costs. The respondents have 
asked for costs in this Court in the event of their being successful. The issues at 
stake are important matters of public interest affecting local government structures 
throughout the Republic. I consider that an appropriate order in this Court is for 
each party to pay its own costs. 
             
In City of Cape Town v Robertson, the Constitutional Court refused to make an order 
of costs despite the respondent's being unsuccessful in contending that the rates 
policies of the City of Cape Town were unconstitutional.69 The Court, per Moseneke 
J, in justifying its refusal stated that:70 
 
The respondents sought to vindicate a constitutional protection. Nothing before us 
suggests that they ought to be mulcted for costs for doing so. On the contrary, an 
order as to costs against the respondents would be inappropriate. I plan to make 
none. In my view it would be fair and just that the parties pay their own costs in the 
High Court and before this Court.  
   
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, there is a growing set of cases heard 
by the Constitutional Court where the Court regarded the nature of the litigation – 
particularly public interest litigation – as an important factor in exercising its 
discretionary powers in relation to costs awards. The court in Christian Roberts 
should have taken note of this trend. 
 
  
                                                          
67  Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole v Premier, Province of the Free 
State 1998 3 692 (CC), as discussed in Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za. 
68   Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 2 BCLR 128 (CC) para 35.  
69    City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC).  
70    City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC) para 79.   
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5.4 Public interest litigation and costs in other South African courts               
Apart from the Constitutional Court, other South African courts have also 
pronounced on the significance of taking public interest litigation as an important 
factor in determining costs. This section looks at some of these cases, in which the 
ordinary common law principles relating to cost orders were departed from.   
 
In Hlatshwayo v Hein the Land Claims Court recognised that before it was a case 
that could be "recognised as falling under a new era of public interest litigation" and 
that "[t]his tends to set it apart from conventional litigation". The Court further stated 
that:71 
 
…our law recognises that in the exercise of its discretion relating to costs a court 
may deprive a successful party of his or her costs and the trend in the Constitutional 
Court at least appears to be in the direction of recognising public interest cases as 
one of those circumstances where it may be appropriate to do so.    
    
In Silvermine Valley Coalition, the Cape High Court – in an environmental law 
context – made a pertinent observation regarding costs in public interest litigation. In 
this case there was a failed attempt by the applicant to prevent the development of a 
vineyard in a nature conservation area. In determining costs, the Court stated:72 
 
NGOs should not have unnecessary obstacles placed in their way when they act in 
a manner designed to hold the State and indeed the private community to the 
constitutional commitments of our new society, which includes the protection of the 
environment.   
   
In Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town, the Court refused to make an adverse 
costs order against the applicant despite the applicant's losing the case. 73  The 
applicant had challenged the power of a Municipality to levy service charges 
comprising "partly property rates" and "partly service fees". The Court held that 
"even though the interests the applicant seeks to promote are the private interests of 
the individuals whom it represents, the applicant raises a constitutional issue of 
                                                          
71   Hlatshwayo v Hein 1999 2 SA 834 (LCC) para 22.  
72    Silvermine Valley Coalition v Sybrand Van der Spuy Boerderye 2002 1 SA 478 (C) 491-493.   
73    Rates Coalition Group v City of Cape Town 2004 5 SA 545 (C).  
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substance and of public interest" as the applicant was seeking to "ventilate an 
important issue of constitutional principle".74   
 
The Witwatersrand Local Division in Nzimande v Nzimande, stated that where the 
litigants sought to test the implementation and application of a statute with socio-
economic implications, then "[s]uch persons should not be discouraged from doing 
so by the risk of having to pay the costs of their adversaries, if the Court takes a view 
which is different from the view taken by the appellant", as long as "the grounds of 
attack on the impugned statute are not acted from improper motives or there are 
other circumstances which make it in the interests of justice to direct [that] such 
costs should be paid by the losing party."75     
        
In Institute for Democracy in South Africa the Cape High Court concisely summed up 
the approach to costs in public interest litigation raising constitutional issues as 
follows:76 
 
The guiding principle in this regard appears to be that the question of costs in 
constitutional and public interest litigation remains a discretionary matter. However, 
parties who litigate to test the constitutionality of law or conduct usually seek to 
ventilate important issues relating to constitutional principle. Such persons should 
not be discouraged from doing so by running the risk of having to pay the costs of 
their adversaries, if the court takes a view which is different from the view taken by 
the petitioner. These principles have been applied uniformly where litigation is 
against an organ of State. The same principles apply in cases involving private 
litigants where a party litigates for public purposes and in the public interest. The 
Court's discretion could be exercised against a private litigant, however, inter alia, 
where the litigation was spurious or frivolous or where such litigant has not acted in 
good faith or where it was apparently pursuing private commercial interests. In my 
view, the applicants in the present case raised matters of great public interest and 
concern - not for any benefit or advantage to themselves, but bona fide and for the 
common good, as perceived by them. Moreover, the points they raised, though 
ultimately unsuccessful, were not without merit. In line with the general approach 
outlined above, I am of the view that it would be fair if no order as to costs were 
made, thus leaving each party to pay its own costs. 
 
The trend therefore appears to have been followed by other courts in South Africa 
that the judicial discretion in relation costs awards in a constitutional litigation, 
particularly against the State, brought in the public interest – unless the application is 
                                                          
74    Rates Coalition Group v City of Cape Town 2004 5 SA 545 (C) para 113.   
75    Nzimande v Nzimande 2005 1 SA 83 (W) para 75.  
76    Institute for Democracy in South Africa v African National Congress 2005 5 SA 39 (C) paras 60-
62.  
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frivolous or vexatious or the applicant behaved in an objectionable manner – is to be 
exercised in such a manner that it does not lead to adverse costs orders against 
such litigants, particularly where they are unsuccessful.    
 
5.5 Public interest litigation and costs in other countries 
 
This section briefly looks at other countries which share South Africa's general rules 
on costs award, perhaps as a result of sharing the same common law heritage with 
South Africa. Their jurisprudence is particularly helpful as these countries appear to 
take the same approach as our courts in relation to costs in public interest litigation. 
 
5.5.1 The United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom the attitude of courts in relation to costs in public interest 
litigation is succinctly set out in R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry.77 In this case the Court of Appeal stated that78   
 
 
some … authorities… demonstrate a trend towards protecting litigants, who 
reasonably bring public law proceedings in the public interest, from the liability to 
costs that falls, as a general rule, on an unsuccessful party.  
 
Unlike in South Africa, there is another mechanism through which public interest 
litigants can shield themselves from a potentially economically ruinous costs order. 
This is done through the so-called "Protective Costs Order", in terms of which a party 
may approach the court ahead of a hearing for an order limiting the party's liability for 
costs should it be unsuccessful. This mechanism was used in the recent case of 
Campaign Against Arms Trade v BAE Systems PLC.79      
 
                                                          
77    R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 2005 1 WLR 2600 per 
Brook J. See Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.3, also citing the case of R v 
Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Shelter 1997 COD per Carnwath J.     
78    R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 2005 1 WLR 2600 para 
41. 
79   Campaign Against Arms Trade v BAE Systems PLC 2007 EWHC 330 (QB) per King J, as 
discussed in R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 2005 1 
WLR 2600 para 13.4, also referring to R v The Prime Minister ex p CND 2002 EWHC 2712 
(Admin) and King v Telegraph Group Limited 2005 1 WLR 2282.  
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5.5.2 Canada 
 
The Canadian Courts also accord significance to public interest litigation as a factor 
to be taken into account in determining costs. In Mahar v Rogers Cable Systems Ltd 
the Court stated:80 
      
(I)t is fair to characterise this proceeding as a public interest suit. While the ordinary 
cost rules apply in public interest litigation, those rules do include a discretion to 
relieve the loser of the burden of paying the winner's costs and that discretion has 
on occasion been exercised in favour of public interest litigants. … In my view, it is 
appropriate in this case to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant and to 
make no order as to costs. The issue raised was novel and certainly involved a 
matter of public interest. While I decided the jurisdictional point against the 
applicant, I am satisfied that the application was brought in good faith for the 
genuine purpose of having a point of law of general public interest resolved. 
 
In B (R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, there was an unsuccessful 
application by certain Jehova's Witnesses, who contended that their Charter rights 
had been infringed when a blood transfusion was administered to their daughter 
despite their disapproval.81 The District Court ordered that the Attorney-General who 
had intervened in the case pay the costs of the applicants.82 The order was upheld 
by both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.     
 
The special significance of public interest litigation as a factor in the consideration of 
costs  was endorsed  in the Okanagan Indian  Band case,83 which  involved  a 
challenge by the Okanagan Indian Band to a prohibition on logging on their land 
without the loggers having obtained prior approval. They contended that the 
prohibition infringed their constitutionally protected aboriginal rights. With regards to 
costs, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:84 
 
                                                          
80   Mahar v Rogers Cable Systems Ltd 1995 25 OR (3
rd
) 690 (General Division) 703b, quoting Orkin 
Law of Costs 2-33 to 2-34). See Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.5.  
81   B (R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto 1995 1 SCR 315, as discussed in 
Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para.6.        
82    B (R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto 1995 1 SCR 315 para 122. Also referring 
to Canadian Newspapers C. v Attorney-General of Canada 1986 32 DLR (4
th
) 292 (Ont HCJ); Re 
Lavigne and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (No.2) 1987 60 OR (2
nd
) 486 (HCJ).           
83  British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band 2003 3 SCR 371 (SCC), as 
discussed in Friedlander 1995 McGill L J 55; Tollefson 2006 Can J Admin Law Pract 39.     
84   British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band 2003 3 SCR 371 (SCC) para 27.    
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[A] consideration relevant to the application of costs rules is access to justice. This 
factor has increased in importance as litigation over matters of public interest has 
become more common, especially since the advent of the Charter. In special cases 
where individual litigants of limited means seek to enforce their constitutional rights, 
courts often exercise their discretion on costs so as to avoid the harshness that 
might result from adherence to the traditional principles. This helps to ensure that 
ordinary citizens have access to the justice system when they seek to resolve 
matters of consequence to the community as a whole.   
 
5.5.3 New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand too, public interest litigation is encouraged inter alia by shielding that 
category of litigants from adverse costs orders where the applications are genuine. 
In New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General of New Zealand the Privy Council 
let the parties keep their own costs even though the appellants had been 
unsuccessful. This was because the appellants, said the Board, did not litigate for 
private gain, but "in the interests of taonga which is an important part of the heritage 
of New Zealand".85            
 
This approach to costs in public interest litigation by the Privy Council was affirmed 
in the recent case of Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental 
Organisations v Department of the Environment. Although the applicants were 
unsuccessful in their application for an interim order to stop the continued 
construction of a hydro-electric scheme, the Board declined to make an order as to 
costs. It was stated that "the board has decided that because this was a public 
interest case there should be no order to the costs of appeal, including the 
proceedings of the conservatory order".86  
 
5.5.4 Australia 
 
In Australia the matter of costs in public interest litigation had received the attention 
of the Australian Law Reform Commission (hereinafter the "ALRC"). In 1995 the 
                                                          
85  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General of New Zealand 1994 1 AC 466, as quoted in 
Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.9.   
86    Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organisations v Department of the 
Environment 2003 UKPC 63; Order of the Privy Council 29 January 2003. See Biowatch 2007 
www.biowatch.org.za 10. 
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ALRC published a report87 in which it stated that public interest litigation was an 
"important mechanism for clarifying legal issues to the benefit of the general 
community, and commented that what it described as 'the costs indemnity rule' had a 
deterrent effect on this type of litigation".88 The ALRC recommended that "courts or 
tribunals should have power to make public interest costs orders at any stage of the 
proceedings, and suggested criteria which should be taken into account when 
determining what type of order to make".89 It was suggested that it might be ordered 
that each party bear its own costs, or that: 90   
 
…the party applying for the public interest costs order, regardless of the outcome of 
the proceedings, shall not be liable to pay the other party's costs; …only be liable to 
pay a specified proportion of the other party's costs; or … be able to recover part of 
his or her costs from the other party.              
 
In Oshlack v Richmond Council, the High Court of Australia upheld a decision by the 
court a quo not to award costs in favour of the respondents who successfully 
defended an application aimed at preserving endangered fauna. In the Court's view 
there were "sufficient special circumstances to justify departure from the ordinary 
rules as to costs". These circumstances, according to the Court, included the fact 
that, firstly, "[t]he appellant had nothing to gain from the litigation other than the 
worthy motive of seeking to uphold environmental law and the preservation of 
endangered fauna". Secondly, "[a] significant number of members of the public 
shared the appellant's stance, so that in that sense there was a public interest in the 
outcome of the litigation". And, thirdly, according to the Court, 91   
 
…the challenge had raised and resolved significant issues as to the interpretation 
and future administration of statutory provisions relating to the protection of 
endangered fauna and the present and future administration of the development 
consent in question, which had implications for the council, the developer and the 
public.    
 
The jurisprudence in these countries thus points to a settled international legal 
position in relation to costs in public interest litigation. Notwithstanding Sachs J's 
remarks in Biowatch, there appear to be no compelling reasons why South African 
                                                          
87   ALRC 1995 www.alrc.gov.au. 
88    ALRC 1995 www.alrc.gov.au para 13.8. See Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.11.    
89    Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.11.   
90    Biowatch 2007 www.biowatch.org.za para 13.11.  
91   Oshlack v Richmond River Council 1997 152 ALR 83 (HCA).        
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courts should not fully embrace this trend, which is designed to serve the twin goals 
of encouraging public interest litigation and to promote access to justice.      
    
5.6  Applying the costs principles to Christian Roberts  
 
I now turn to applying the costs principles discussed above to Christian Roberts.  
 
5.6.1 Costs in constitutional litigation 
 
The line of cases looked at above has established clear principles in relation to costs 
in constitutional litigation. Where a private litigant brings a case raising an important 
constitutional issue, such as testing the constitutionality of a statute, and loses the 
challenge, unless the challenge was bad or the private litigant behaved in an 
objectionable manner, a court must depart from the traditional common law principle 
regarding costs – that costs must follow the event – and order that each party keep 
its costs. It is thus submitted that while the Court had found against the applicants on 
the merits, the constitutional dimension precluded the judge from making an adverse 
costs order against the applicants and the amici. Furthermore, there existed no 
special circumstances in the case to justify departure from this important 
constitutional principle. It is admitted that the High Court costs orders in cases such 
as Affordable Medicine92 and Biowatch93 did perhaps set a precedent for the manner 
in which the Court in Christian Roberts exercised its judicial discretion in relation to 
costs in a litigation with a constitutional dimension, but these costs orders were 
sharply criticised and overturned on appeal.  
 
5.6.2 Frivolous or vexatious applications 
 
Secondly, it must be asked if the case was frivolous or vexatious, and if the 
applicants during litigation behaved in a manner justifying a punitive costs order 
against them. This must be asked because the Court did hint that the conduct of the 
                                                          
92   Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC). 
93    Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC). 
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applicants (and the amici) was a factor in determining the costs award. In particular 
the Court made this (troubling) remark: 94 
 
The amici curiae, in essence, had ganged with the applicants against the 
respondents … and they should be regarded as having failed in their quest, thus 
attracting costs against them. 
 
This remark, which is the only discernible reason from the judgment as to why the 
Court punished the applicants with a costs order, is unfortunate indeed. There was 
nothing frivolous or vexatious about the conduct of both the amici and the applicants 
in this matter. Furthermore, there was nothing "spurious" about the grounds upon 
which the amici and the applicants attacked the legislation in question.  
 
5.6.3 Costs in public interest litigation  
 
Thirdly, not only was the matter brought to test the constitutionality of a statute, but it 
was also instituted in the public interest. As shown above, the trend – both in South 
Africa and abroad – is to shield this category of litigants from adverse costs orders, 
unless such litigants behave in a manner warranting punitive costs orders. There are 
dire implications for a public interest litigant where a court departs from this 
approach. The implications have financial, jurisprudential and access-to-justice 
dimensions. In the first place, public interest litigants are advocacy groups who rely 
on donor funding to carry out their activities, including seeking to realise the 
constitutional rights of indigent South Africans. Their important social contribution 
would be threatened by the risk of adverse costs whenever they are unsuccessful in 
genuine applications sought to vindicate constitutional rights. 
 
Secondly, adverse costs orders against public interest litigants threaten to stall, if not 
reverse, the contribution this category of litigants has made and continues to make to 
the development of South African constitutional jurisprudence. The Court in 
Biowatch95 recognised that the participation of public interest NGOs has led to the 
                                                          
94  Christian Roberts v Minister of Social Development Unreported Case No 32838/05 (TPD) para 
41. 
95   Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 10 BCLR 1014 (CC) para 19.   
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development of constitutional jurisprudence in areas such as access to housing,96 
access  to  land,97  the  rights of  the  child,98  gender  equality,99  freedom of 
expression,100 and the rights of gay men and lesbian women,101 among others.  
 
The third implication of ignoring this growing trend is to curtail access to the courts, 
and therefore access to justice. For instance, of the right of access to housing cases 
referred to, eviction cases constitute a majority. These often involve poor people. 
Without the support and participation of public interest groups such poor citizens 
would have very limited access to justice. It is thus submitted that the constitutional 
practice of shielding public interest litigants from adverse costs orders in genuine 
cases should be followed by all courts.                        
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This note dealt with two issues emanating from the High Court's judgment in the 
Christian Roberts case, which have implications for constitutional law generally and 
public interest litigation in particular. The two issues are mootness and the approach 
to costs in litigation with a constitutional dimension, particularly between the state 
and a private litigant. It has been shown here that the decision by the state to amend 
the legislation complained of during litigation rendered the matter moot. This meant 
that judgment in the matter would be for purely academic purposes, as the violation 
                                                          
96   See for example Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Mainstreet 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC); Jaftha v Schoeman; Van   
Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 1 BCLR 78 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 
BCLR 1268 (CC) and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 
1169 (CC).  
97  See President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 
(CC) and Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC). 
98   See Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 7 BCLR 637 (CC); Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC); AD v DW 2008 4 BCLR 359 (CC); S v M (Centre for Child 
Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC); Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission 
for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission 
v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC).  
99    See for example Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 6 BCLR 682 (CC); K v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC) and Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC). 
100  See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Fincance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International 2005 8 743 (CC); South African Defence Union v Minister of Defence 
2007 8 BCLR 863 (CC) and The Citizen 78 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 8 BCLR 816.   
101  See Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2003 10 BCLR 1092 (CC) and National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC).    
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or threat of violation of the applicant's rights ceased as a result of the change in 
legislation. By proceeding to decide the merits in the matter, the High Court defied 
the caution by the Constitutional Court in JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd that courts should 
not exercise their judicial discretion to decide points which are abstract, academic or 
hypothetical.   
 
It has also been demonstrated that the High Court did not follow the proper approach 
in respect to costs in litigation with a constitutional dimension brought against the 
State by a private party. In such matters the State should be ordered to pay the legal 
costs of the private litigant if he or she is successful. If the private litigant loses the 
challenge, each party should shoulder his or her legal costs. There are, however, 
exceptions to this general principle. If the challenge by the individual is frivolous or 
vexatious, or the grounds upon which the challenge rests are objectionable, the 
private litigant will not escape an adverse costs order.  
 
It has been argued that the adverse costs awards against the applicants and the 
amici in the Christian Roberts were not justified as the conduct of the litigants was 
neither frivolous nor vexatious. Furthermore, the grounds upon which the impugned 
legislation and the accompanying regulations were challenged were above board as 
they precipitated an amendment of the statute complained of.    
 
Finally, it has been shown that the implications of departing from this sensible 
approach to costs in public interest litigation are dire. Not only would the risk of 
attracting adverse costs orders in good constitutional challenges dishearten this 
group of litigants, but it would arrest the development of constitutional jurisprudence. 
Most significantly, keeping public interest groups away from courts through adverse 
costs orders would shatter the only hope that poor citizens currently have of 
accessing the courts, and therefore of accessing justice.      
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